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Reviews of Books

litical entrepreneurs who exploited the space created by
interest-group conflict and the balance of economic
forces” (p. 9).
The key in all of this is the role of Congress. It was
where the new regulatory agencies came into existence
and where their form and functions took on character.
Harrison utilizes a case study approach in analyzing key
legislative measures and relies heavily on roll call analysis-Guttman scaling, calculations of the value of Yules’
Q, cluster analysis, and group averaging to gather the
characteristics that will define political progressivism.
What he finds is a fairly cohesive political grouping led
by Republican insurgents from the Midwest and Democrats from the South that began to demonstrate a preference for modern, rational, bureaucratic procedures
of decision making over the “vagaries of legislative ‘logrolling,’ which was all too susceptible to constituency
and partisan pressures” (p. 5). These progressives supported stricter control of railroad rates and practices,
a pure food and drug law, federal meat inspection, reform of the banking and currency system, and stronger
antitrust laws. The author notes, however, that their intention was not to replace the corporate system but to
moderate its influence over government and to check
the perceived abuses arising from unregulated corporate power. As spokesmen for their sections, they especially wanted to redress perceived regional imbalances in the economic system.
Harrison’s progressives also tended to draw on traditional elements of republican ideology to portray an
enduring conflict between the “people” and the “interests.” They often described themselves as vigilant protectors of the public interest in opposition to a variety
of special interests who looked to exploit government
for their own advantage. Their actions were, in part,
motivated by public opinion-an awareness of a rising
consumer consciousness and a sense that the public was
becoming morally outraged as muckraking journalists
alerted them to problems. But the concept of the public
interest also served as “a rhetorical device for handling
social conflicts, and for negotiating the tensions between the democratic principle and the elitist implications of administrative decision-making” (p. 258).
Although the author identifies a distinct progressive
movement in Congress, he notes that it did not always
embrace everything we have come to accept as “progressive.” Issues such as conservation policy, child welfare, and trade union rights continued to show divisions
rooted in regionalism, localism, a commitment to
state’s rights, and a willingness to defer difficult economic decisions to the courts. Harrison also notes that
one of the inconsistencies of progressive state-builders
is that many of those who contributed to the creation
of the regulatory state never totally abandoned a distrust of bureaucracy and reservations about the creation of powerful, autonomous regulatory agencies. As
a result, they often allowed reform legislation to be
weakened and compromised. The greatest irony in the
entire process, however, was that in rebelling against
the dictates of party discipline, the progressives dam-
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aged the primary source of leadership and direction in
congressional policy making. In doing so, they undermined the system of party government without completely displacing it. The result was a hybrid structure
in which new forms struggled to coexist with the old
system of “courts and parties.”
This book complements recent works by historically
minded political scientists interested in electoral realignment, congressional “modernization,” and regulatory politics. The uninitiated reader will have to trust
the methodology and the author’s choice of data sets.
That caveat aside, the study makes a significant contribution to early twentieth-century American political
history and to a sharper definition of political progressivism.
STEVEN L. PIOTT
Clarion University
TODD J. PFANNESTIEL. Rethinking the Red Scare: The
Lusk Committee and New York’s Crusade against Radicalism, 1919–1923. (Studies in American Popular History and Culture.) New York: Routledge. 2003. Pp. xiii,
229. $79.95.
Todd J. Pfannestiel’s book is a well-researched, clearly
written contribution both to the increasing literature
examining the first American “red scare” and to the debates over civil liberties and academic freedom that
emerged in the United States in the context of World
War I. While the book concentrates on the State of New
York’s response to the establishment of the Soviet Russia Bureau (under Ludwig Martens) in New York City
and the overall crusade against pro-Soviet radicals in
the entire state, the special contribution of Pfannestiel’s work lies in its examination of Clayton Lusk’s campaign against both the Rand School of Social Science
and public education in New York State as a whole.
While it adds little new to our understanding of the operations of the Martens Bureau or the campaign against
it, we learn much about the struggle for academic freedom in New York’s schools in the early 1920s.
Pfannestiel argues that while the operations of the
Martens Bureau were part of the broader struggle between the Soviet and American governments, the Lusk
Committee soon set its sights on education, and that
“The Red Scare’s most lasting legacy [was] the harm it
did to the hundreds of teachers who were named, investigated, and subsequently tainted under the shortlived Lusk Laws” (p. 133). Unfortunately, while Pfannestiel details the creation and attempted implementation of those laws, and their ultimate demise,
he does not fully explore their impact or the ways in
which they chilled the climate for full and free exploration of political and social issues in New York’s public
schools from 1919 to 1923.
Pfannestiel places his examination squarely in the
context of the emerging “red scare,” first exploring its
underlying causes and then proceeding to a discussion
of the formation of the Lusk Committee and the operations of the Soviet Bureau and the reactions of the
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Canada and the United States
Lusk Committee to it. Here, his treatment is unremarkable, distinguished only by a perhaps more thorough
discussion of the origins of the Lusk Committee, particularly the place of New York politics in its formation.
Much of this has been covered elsewhere, however, notably by Lawrence H. Chamberlain’s Loyalty and Legislative Action (1951) and Julian Jaffe’s Crusade Against
Radicalism: New York during the Red Scare, 1914 –1924
(1972). In his discussion of the origins of the Martens
Bureau, Pfannestiel underplays the important role of
Santeri Nuorteva, the Finnish socialist, who perhaps
did more than any other person to get the Soviet Information Bureau launched in 1919. Readers would do
well to consult Auvo Koistianen, “Santeri Nuorteva and
the Origins of Soviet-American Relations” (American
Studies in Scandinavia 15 [1972]: 1–14.)
The heart of Pfannestiel’s study remains his examination of the Lusk Committee’s attack on the Rand
School of Social Science and academic freedom in public schools in the State of New York. His discussion of
the Rand School is clear and helpful, particularly his
complete list of courses and lecturers, 1919–1920. He
shows both the attacks on the school and the school’s
rather successful response, which generated publicity
and funds to keep itself alive during the controversy. In
fact, in can be argued, partly on the basis of Pfannestiel’s evidence, that a key source for the mobilization of
the liberal community and its formation of the National
Civil Liberties Bureau (later the ACLU), was the defense of the Rand School. The discussion of the attack
on public schools is less successful. The New York State
Senate, at Lusk’s urging, did pass five bills (three of
which were enacted into law) to tackle radicalism in the
state schools: one creating a special secret service to
continue the state’s investigation into education, one
calling for public school teacher certification, and one
requiring private school licensing. However, the furor
over these bills mobilized a wide variety of opposition,
and eventually they were repealed. As Pfannestiel argues, this legislative and political battle “triggered a
negative public response” (p. 127). It may well have
been this outcry that brought an end to the “red scare”
in New York. Pfannestiel’s study, however, leaves one
wanting more. An exploration of the harm done to hundreds, possibly thousands of teachers who were named
and investigated under the Lusk Laws remains to be
written.
DAVID MCFADDEN
Fairfield University
DAVID KAHN. The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail: Herbert
O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 2004. Pp. xxi, 318. $32.50.
Herbert Osborn Yardley is hardly a household name,
yet he is the most famous United States codebreaker
thanks to a sensational book—The American Black
Chamber—he wrote seventy-five years ago. Heretofore
he has not had a biographer, but he certainly has one
now.
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There is a truism, well known to historians, that biographers either love or hate their subjects. David
Kahn has written that rarest of commodities: a balanced
biography of Yardley, warts and all. In so doing he has
reinterpreted Yardley’s role and what we know about
early American communications intelligence. Kahn undertook an exhaustive search covering virtually every
archive in the United States, Canada, Great Britain,
France, and Japan that could conceivably hold documents relating to Yardley. Kahn also interviewed virtually everyone still living who knew Yardley and his
contemporaries. The result is a tour de force, a definitive biography that will lay to rest most of the controversies swirling around Yardley’s career.
Who was Yardley, and why is he important? He was
a State Department clerk-telegrapher who had taught
himself codebreaking. When the United States declared war in spring 1917, Yardley volunteered to set up
a cryptanalysis operation in Military Intelligence. His
offer was accepted, and by the end of the war the United
States had its first communications intelligence organization (MI-8). Kahn notes Yardley was so successful
that, after the armistice, when he proposed to establish
a secret United States government “black chamber,” his
offer was snapped up and jointly funded by the Army
and the State Department.
Established in New York, the Black Chamber targeted Japanese codes from the beginning. When the
1921 Naval Conference convened in Washington, Yardley and his colleagues were reading the two principal
Japanese diplomatic codes in a timely fashion. As a result, the American cryptanalysts enabled their diplomatic colleagues to know with certainty the negotiating
position of the Japanese delegation in regard to naval
tonnage. This codebreaking feat was a major coup, and
Yardley was personally decorated with the coveted Distinguished Service Medal by the Secretary of War.
Kahn relates that despite this achievement there
were substantial budget cuts in successive years that
had a significant impact on the number of codebreakers
that could be employed. In addition, there were serious
problems in obtaining the necessary foreign diplomatic
telegrams from the cable companies. Kahn also dissects
the accusation made by historian Ladislas Farago that
Yardley secretly approached the Japanese Embassy in
Washington and for $7,000 sold information that the
Black Chamber had been reading their codes. He concludes that it never happened, and he is probably correct.
The Black Chamber closed its doors in 1929 when a
new secretary of state, Henry Stimson, shut off funding,
pompously stating that “Gentlemen do not read each
other’s mail” (p. 98). Yardley and his staff were out of
work and the Depression was beginning. Broke and desperate, he decided to write a book about his codebreaking experiences. The result was The American Black
Chamber (1931), which caused a huge uproar. The
Army and the State Department, angry over the book’s
disclosures, denied that the Black Chamber existed,
and the Japanese government was outraged at learning
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